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Middlesex University, London 
 
In his Introduction to Systems Theory, Niklas Luhmann recounts a conversation in 
which Humberto Maturana explained to him how he hit on the term autopoiesis for 
his theory of self-reproducing systems. A philosopher colleague had been explaining 
to him Aristotle’s distinction between praxis (an action that is self-sufficient in the 
sense of being of a certain value in itself) and poiēsis (a “making” – an action that is 
intended to produce something outside itself, a “work”). “Maturana found a bridge 
between the two concepts,” Luhmann writes. “He spoke of autopoiesis, a poiesis that 
is its own work [. . .] the system that is its own work” (Luhmann 2013, 77-8). There is 
an irony here. For Maturana would come to contest Luhmann’s application of the 
concept of autopoiesis to social or communicative systems. Yet  poiēsis is the title of 
Aristotle’s treatise on the “making” of works of art (especially dramatic tragedy), and 
throughout that work he repeatedly has recourse to the analogy between, on the one 
hand, the way that works of art like tragedies are constructed and, on the other, the 
way that organic forms are constructed.  
In this paper, I pursue this question of how narrative fiction can be thought of 
in autopoietic terms. This is not an approach that has yet made much impact in 
narrative theory, though Luhmann (2000) has written at length on autopoiesis and 
the “art system” and Bruce Clarke (2014) on the post-humanist ideological 
implications of thinking about narrative in systems-theoretical ways. My intentions 
in relation to this new field, then, are modest and exploratory.  I draw on three 
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principal sources, and identify three themes that, I suggest, should be central to a 
worked-through theory of autopoiesis and narrative.1 Two of the sources I have 
already mentioned – firstly Aristotle’s Poetics, his defence (against the attacks of his 
former teacher Plato) of the cognitive and ethical value of the arts; and secondly, 
Luhmann’s account of art as a special instance of an autopoietic “social” or 
“communicative” system. The third source is the writings on aesthetics of the Czech 
semiotician and literary scholar Jan Mukařovský. Mukařovský was writing in the 
1930s and -40s in the wake of the emergence, in the linguistics of Saussure and in 
Russian Formalism, of perhaps the first modern ideas of “system” in relation to 
language and literature.2 Yet the “Czech structuralism” of which he was a prominent 
representative took a view of “system” quite different from that which had been 
presented by Saussure (and which would be pursued by structuralism of the French 
school in the nineteen-sixties). One of my concerns will be to show how Luhmann’s 
concepts of operative closure and autopoiesis in relation to artworks are 
foreshadowed both by Mukařovský’s concept of the “contexture” created by the 
“aesthetic function” and by Aristotle’s account of the internal organization of an 
artwork or “mimetic representation”. In all three cases, it will be noted, narrative is 
understood in the context of a general aesthetic theory. Yet for all three, as we shall 
see, narrative constitutes, on account of its explicitly temporal and constructional 
quality, a paradigmatic case. 
                                                     
1 I am writing here about narrative fiction – that is, narratives that distinguish themselves as “made” 
in the sense of “made up”: they involve artistry and constitute works of “art”. This raises the question 
of the use of narrative forms in non-artistic and non-fictional contexts. There is not space in this paper 
to address this question directly, but I take it that it could be handled in terms of the poly-functionalist 
view of language set out in Section 2 of this paper. 
2 Luhmann acknowledges Saussure as a source for his “difference-theoretical” approach to systems – 
that is, the notion that the operations of social systems are based (like Saussure’s langue, or language-
system) on difference (Luhmann 2013, 44-5). 
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 The connections between these three disparate sources coalesce around the 
three ideas that I suggest should be central to a theory of narrative and autopoiesis. 
The first is closure – or, to use terms that I will explain below, the “operative closure” 
by which a system distinguishes itself, through its own internal operations, from its 
environment. (Here, as far as Aristotle is concerned, I will be concerned in particular 
with the extrapolations from the Poetics of two neo-Aristotelian narrative theorists, 
Paul Ricoeur and Meir Sternberg.) From my treatment of this first idea emerge the 
key issues of perception and recursion. The second section, on observation, takes up 
these themes in relation to function and what Luhmann terms “second-order” 
observation. The final section, on coupling, considers the constraints that interacting 
autopoietic systems impose on one another, and how this process should be 
understood in relation to narrative. Here I contrast the views of Aristotle and 
Mukařovský, which are rooted in the notion of the unified subject, with that of, 
Luhmann, according to which the productive mutual constraints at work in narrative 
are those, not between subject and object (e.g. reader and text), but between 
autopoietic systems of perception and communication.   
1) Closure 
Tragedy, Aristotle writes, is “an imitation [mimēsis] of an action that is complete in 
itself, as a whole of some magnitude”:  
Now a whole is that which has beginning, middle, and end. A beginning is that 
which is not necessarily after anything else, and which has naturally 
something else after it; a middle is that which is by nature after one thing and 
has also another after it; and an end is that which is naturally after something 
itself, either as its necessary or usual consequent, and with nothing else after 
it. (Aristotle 1941, 1462 [1450b]) 
Aristotle is using “action” in a particular sense here. There is a general sense of an 
action as seen from the point of view of an agent – that is the things s/he does, the 
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actions that s/he performs. And there is the sense of an “action” as seen from a 
broader, external perspective (such as that of an audience in a theatre), which 
encompasses origins and consequences of which the agent may be unaware. It is the 
latter sense that Aristotle is using when he refers to “an action that is complete in 
itself” (Rorty 1992a, 7-8). Tragedy represents this unity of an action (in this strong 
sense) through its muthos, which Aristotle defines as its “organization of events” (ē 
tōn pragmatōn sustasis) – or, as Paul Ricoeur parses the term sustasis in his 
commentary on Aristotle’s Poetics, its “organizing the events into a system” (Ricoeur 
1984, 33). In Aristotle’s account, a well-constructed “complex plot” (Sophocles’ 
Oedipus is his favoured example) crucially includes elements of “discovery” and 
“reversal of fortune” for the protagonist: these elements hinge on the disparity 
between the two senses of action – on the one hand, discrete actions from the 
perspective of the agent, and, on the other, “whole” actions from a point of view 
taking in origins and consequences. 
Paul Ricoeur (1984) and Meir Sternberg (1992) have drawn from Aristotle 
parallel conclusions concerning the temporality of narrative. Both have highlighted 
how Aristotle’s concept of discrete events making up a single temporal whole, the 
representation of a “single action” (in the strong sense), implies a simultaneity of two 
different ways of experiencing the narrative – one “chronological” or “episodic”, the 
other “teleological” or “configurational” The chrono-logic of succession drives 
forward from beginning to end, while the “grasping together” of teleo-logic looks 
back from the end to the beginning (Ricoeur 1984, 66-8). Sternberg highlights how 
the differentiation and phasing of these two streams produces such narrative effects 
as curiosity, suspense and surprise (Sternberg 1992, 474-79). The important point 
here about the reinterpretations of Aristotle by Ricoeur and Sternberg is that they 
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share an insistence that the unity or closure of narrative cannot be conceived purely 
in (mono)linear terms, in terms of the beginning- and end-points of a single line. The 
non-linear differentiation outlined above, whereby actions are seen simultaneously 
as causes of effects and as functions of a whole that is oriented towards the perceiver, 
creates what one might term a bi- or multi-linearity in the perception of narrative. 
For Jan Mukařovský, the key term for the temporal whole of narrative is 
“contexture”. In line with the neo-Aristotelianism of Ricoeur and Sternberg, he 
characterizes contexture in dynamic and constructional terms, as “a sequence of 
semantic units (e.g., words, sentences), a sequence unalterable without a change in 
the whole, in which the meaning accumulates successively” (Mukařovský 1977 
[1945], 73). And we find, too, the same differentiation between two phases –a phase 
of linear succession and a phase of retrospective configuration from the point of view 
of a projected or achieved endpoint. A narrative presents itself as a succession, but 
simultaneously “the semantic intention tending toward the wholeness of the 
contexture accompanies its perception from the first word” (74). 
  Mukařovský’s distinctive contribution to this discussion of narrative’s closure 
lies in the way his focus on function clarifies two points that we see emerge from 
Ricoeur’s and Sternberg’s accounts: the gearing of the temporal whole to the 
perception of the reader/audience, and the generation of a recursive, non-linear 
structure whereby textual elements are seen simultaneously according to different 
functions. In order to appreciate this contribution, it is necessary to give a brief 
account of his poly-functionalist semiotics.3 Mukařovský constructs a typology of 
linguistic functions on the basis of two distinctions. The first is a distinction between, 
                                                     
3 Mukařovský was influenced by the functionalist semiotics of Karl Bühler (1990 [1934]): I will discuss 
the significance of this influence in the following section. 
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on the one hand, uses of the sign that are directed immediately at reality, and, on the 
other hand, uses of the sign that take the mediating role of the sign as itself the object 
of the sign. The former uses are either “practical” functions, which directly interact 
with reality (an instruction, for example, or an expressive cry of pain or alarm), or 
“theoretical” functions, which aim to represent reality in the mind (scientific 
language being a prime example). The latter uses – those which take the mediating 
role of the sign as their object – are either “symbolic” functions, which have as their 
object the association or mediation between the sign and reality (Mukařovský gives 
the example of a national flag), or “aesthetic” functions, which take as their object the 
mediation between the sign and the perceiving subject. The second distinction, which 
forms the basis of the sub-categories listed above, is a distinction as to whether the 
language is oriented towards the subject or the object. Thus the practical function is 
oriented towards its object (reality) in the sense that here the language interacts 
directly with reality, seeking to change or express it, whereas in the case of the 
theoretical function the language is oriented towards the subject in that it is aimed 
not at changing or directly expressing reality but at constructing an image of reality 
in the mind of the subject. The “symbolic” function is said to be oriented towards the 
object because the mediation at stake is that between sign and object, whereas in the 
case of the “aesthetic” the mediation that forms the object of the sign is, as we have 
said, that between sign and perceiving subject. Mukařovský combines these 
distinctions to form this matrix of basic functional possibilities (Mukařovský 1977 
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These possibilities and interrelations should be seen in terms of a 
simultaneous poly-functionality: “As a rule, several functions are not only potentially 
but actually present in an act or creation, and among them there may be some which 
the agent or creator did not think of or did not even desire. No sphere of human 
action or human creation is limited to a single function. There is always a greater 
number of functions, and there are tensions, variances, and balancing among them” 
(Mukařovský 1977 [1942], 37). An innumerable variety of hierarchical interrelations 
between these functions is possible – in advertising, for example, one finds a 
subordination of the aesthetic function to practical functions (32). A fictional 
narrative will contain language used for many different functions, belonging to any of 
the practical, theoretical and symbolic (or indeed aesthetic) categories set out above: 
but these functions will themselves be the object of the overarching aesthetic 
function. 
 Thus the aesthetic function, for Mukařovský, involves an orientation with two 
aspects. It is an orientation towards the sign itself – that is, in a work of art, towards 
the whole of the work of art as a sign – but more specifically, it is an orientation 
towards the subject’s response or attitude towards the sign (a response that is in 
principle open-ended rather than determined by a particular relation to reality). One 
might take as an example Jasper Johns’ famous Pop Art painting Stars and Stripes. 
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Mukařovský, as we have seen, cites a national flag as being a prime example of the 
symbolic function: it is geared to the identification of the sign with a particular 
portion of reality (the country, the nation, the people).4 In Johns’ painting, this 
symbolic function is not erased: rather, this function becomes itself a sign that is the 
object of the aesthetic function, thus orienting it towards the open-ended, 
indeterminate response of the perceiver. In general, according to Mukařovský, when 
the aesthetic function is dominant – that is, in an artistic work such as a fictional 
narrative – subordinate functions will tend to proliferate: the aesthetic function is 
characterized “by the fact that it adds a facet to the acting individual’s functional 
diversity in some way” (Mukařovský 1977 [1942], 38). These two aspects of the 
aesthetic function lead to a seemingly paradoxical situation whereby the work of art 
is oriented both towards maximal closure and unity (because all the functions are 
oriented towards the whole of the work of art as a sign) and simultaneously towards 
maximal internal differentiation and diversification (because the orientation is 
simultaneously towards the whole of the subject’s existence).5  
 This relation between perception, recursion and closure is central to 
Luhmann’s concept of “form”. Luhmann’s systems theory is based on a “differential 
or difference theoretical approach” that draws on British mathematician George 
Spencer Brown’s calculus of distinctions, presented in his book The Laws of Form 
(Spencer Brown 1969). Spencer Brown begins with an injunction: “Draw a 
distinction!” (In the context of the preceding discussion of poly-functionality, one 
might take the example of a distinction between two linguistics functions.) On the 
                                                     
4 This identification can be seen in the idea that an insult to the one is an insult to the other – hence 
laws against “desecrating” the flag in, for example, the United States. 
5 Mukařovský’s argument that the aesthetic function tends to generate poly-functionality can be 
compared to Meir Sternberg’s “Proteus Principle” concerning narrative –the idea that narrative is 
characterised by a many-to-many correlation between form and function (see Pianzola, this volume). 
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“unmarked space” of the blank sheet of paper, he marks the distinction with the 
following form (Spencer Brown 1969, 4): 
  
 
This form is a unity that is, paradoxically, also a difference – the difference between 
the distinction proper (the vertical line), which has two sides, and the indication of 
the distinction (the horizontal line), which marks only one side of the distinction. The 
indication of a distinction is internal to the distinction and marks only one side of a 
two-sided form: every distinction has an “unmarked” space that is the choice of this 
(as opposed to any other) distinction: “When handling a distinction, you always have 
a blind spot or something invisible behind your back. You cannot observe yourself as 
the one who handles the distinction. Rather you must make yourself invisible if you 
want to observe” (Luhmann 2013, 104).6  
 Luhmann follows Spencer Brown in using the term “form” for the boundary 
articulated by a distinction. A form is asymmetrical because, although it has two 
sides, at any one time only one of the sides is indicated. Thus a system distinguishes 
itself from its environment through its internal operations. An artwork is such a 
form, for it strives towards just such a “double-closure”: “A work of art must 
distinguish itself externally from other objects and events, or it will lose itself in the 
world. Internally, the work closes itself off by limiting further possibilities with each 
of its formal decisions” (Luhmann 2000, 29). Narrative is exemplary in this respect: 
                                                     
6 A different formulation of the same point, from a phenomenological perspective, can be found in 
Mikhail Bakhtin’s essay “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity”, where he describes the asymmetric 
relation between a self that is the unique origin of a subjectivity and a self that presents itself as an 
object to that subjectivity: there will always be an “excess” of the one over the other, whereby the 
“horizon” of the subjectivity exceeds that of the self that it encompasses as object (Bakhtin 1990 
[1920-23), 22-23).  
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“A narration, opens with the phrase ‘once upon a time . . . ,’ which demarcates an 
imaginary space for the unfolding of the narration at the exclusion of everything else” 
(Luhmann 2000, 32). Taken as whole, “the sequence of operations closes itself off 
and in doing so excludes other things” (33). Luhmann invokes in this context the 
same term, “contexture”, employed by Mukařovský: “Every choice of contexture 
generates a surrounding space, the unmarked space of Spencer Brown’s formal 
calculus” (Luhmann 2000, 33).  
In drawing a boundary, as we have indicated, the sequence of operations 
limits itself to internal operations. These internal operations that articulate a form 
are recursive, since any crossing into the unmarked space of a distinction 
presupposes the original distinction: the form, in Spencer Brown’s formulation, 
“reenters” the form (Luhmann 2000, 139). In terms of narrative, such recursion 
guarantees connectivity within the narrative and justifies describing the narrative as 
a form of autopoiesis, in that 
the elements of the system are produced within the network of the system’s 
elements, that is, through recursions. A communication cannot occur as an 
isolated phenomenon, as a singular event brought about by a combination of 
physical, chemical, living, and psychic causes. Nor can it proceed through 
simple replication, merely by substituting disappearing elements for one 
another. (Luhmann 2000, 49)7 
Thus Luhmann’s difference-theoretical approach clarifies at a high level of 
abstraction how the sequential series of successive “distinctions” of which the 
narrative is composed is simultaneously a recursive unfolding of that which is given 
                                                     
7 In narrative fiction, Luhmann’s stricture concerning the “isolated phenomenon” or “singular event” 
can be applied even to those features that Roland Barthes (1989) groups together under the term 
“reality effect”  – that is, “realistic” details or specifications that are deliberately inconsequential to the 
plot or theme: here, as Barthes points out, the apparently  “singular event” authenticates the “realism” 
(the “referential illusion”) of the narrative considered as a totality, as a singular, whole aesthetic sign: 
these details  “say nothing but this: we are the real; it is the category of ‘the real’ (and not its 
contingent contents) which is then signified” (Barthes 1989, 148). 
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at the beginning – provided, that is, that one understands that “given” in terms of the 
initiating articulation of a form (in Mukařovský’s terms, an orientation of the sign to 
the whole of the aesthetic sign of which it is an element).  
It also helps to clarify the linkage between this recursive dynamic, on the one 
hand, and, on the other hand, the polyfunctionality that Mukařovský points to as the 
basis of narrative’s non-linear dimension. “A function,” as Luhmann writes, “is 
nothing other than a focus for comparison. It marks a problem [. .] in such a way that 
multiple solutions can be compared and that the problem remains open for further 
selections and substitutions”  (Luhmann 2000, 138). Functions are also available, as 
we have seen in our earlier discussion of Mukařovský, for recursive operations. In a 
narrative, an action or use of language that serves one particular function can 
simultaneously serve (or can subsequently come to be seen to simultaneously serve) 
a quite different function. On the other hand, functionality emerges from what 
Luhmann calls “second-order observation”: 
Unlike purpose, function does not serve the orientation of first-order 
observers – of the actor himself, his advisors, or his critics. An operation 
needs no knowledge of its function; it can substitute a purpose [. . .] 
Thus the consideration of functionality raises the issue of observation (including that 
of what Luhmann means here by “second-order observation). It is to this issue that I 
now turn.  
2) Observation 
The function of art in the modern world, according to Luhmann, is to bring to 
consciousness the interaction of perception and communication: in non-artistic 
contexts “communication captivates perception and thereby directs awareness”, 
whereas “[a]rt seeks a different kind of relationship between perception and 
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communication – one that is irritating and defies normality – and just this is 
communicated” (Luhmann 2000, 23). Art deals in meanings (including linguistic 
meaning), but it is also something that is perceived, a “quasi-object” whose operative 
closure (as we have seen in the previous section) distinguishes it from everything else 
in the world. Above all, art is a prime example of a “second-order” observation 
system – a system constituted not just by “first-order” operations of observation and 
distinction-making (as outlined in the previous section), but also by second-order 
“observations of observations”. 
 Before turning to Luhmann’s account of art as a second-order observation 
system – and its particular application to narrative – I will draw out how versions of 
its basic conceptual linkage between perception and communication can be found, 
too, both in Aristotle and in Mukařovský’s concept of the aesthetic function. In 
Aristotle, the key term is mimēsis.8 Aristotle’s concept of mimēsis should be 
distinguished, in the first place, from the Platonic idea that a representation is a 
degenerate third-hand copy (coming after the object it represents, which itself comes 
after the Ideal Form of which the object is a partial realization). Aristotle comes at 
the question of representation, by contrast, from the point of view of human 
development. Mimetic representation, for Aristotle, is natural to children and is one 
of the primary features that distinguishes humans from animals: it both increases the 
scope for learning and is inherently pleasurable (Aristotle 1941, 1456 [1448a]). 
Although it is a form of iconicity, an imitative relation whereby a similarity is 
perceived between the representation and what it represents, Aristotle gives mimēsis 
                                                     
8 Mimēsis is often given in English as “imitation”, which has somewhat belittling connotations that 
don’t do justice to the key role that he saw it playing in human cognition and development. Here I 
follow Stephen Halliwell (1986) in preferring the term “mimetic representation”, in which an iconic or 
imitative aspect is understood.  
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a surprisingly wide scope, taking in not just visual art and drama, but also dance and 
even music. Written narrative is also a mimetic representation, and not just at those 
points where the author (through “direct speech”) “impersonates” or “takes on” the 
voice of characters: the narrative as a whole is also a mimetic representation in that 
in narrating the author is “taking on” the voice a fictive narrator. Aryeh Kosman’s 
commentary on the Poetics provides a useful gloss on this point: 
A poet [. .] is not primarily a creator of things that imitate: it is the poet 
himself who is an imitator in that she makes imitation things. It is not, in 
other words, that the poet is an imitator because she creates a piece of 
discourse that imitates a non-discursive reality; she is an imitator because she 
imitates a speaker speaking about reality, though it is not her reality, but the 
reality of that fictional speaker’s fictional world. It is this relation between the 
poet and the speaker that is the primary imitative relation. The poet creates an 
imitation speaker who makes real speeches in the imitative world, ‘imaginary 
gardens with real toads in them’ as Marianna Moore once put it, not 
imaginary toads in gardens that are real. (Kosman 1992, 57) 
Mimetic representation, then is an imitative action by the author, and its reception 
by the audience is similarly constructional.  
An artistic representation, according to Aristotle, has the sensible qualities of 
an ordinary object, but qua representation these qualities take on for the perceiver 
an additional function in that they are perceived also in terms of their relation to the 
object represented: it is through contemplation of this extra dimension, Aristotle 
argues, that we are able to take pleasure in representations of objects distasteful in 
themselves, such as a painting of a corpse (Aristotle 1941, 1457 [1448b]). In her 
commentary on the Poetics, Elizabeth Belfiore provides the following gloss on 
theōria or “contemplation”, the term that Aristotle employs for the perception of the 
mimetic, representational object:  
by means of theōria we learn and reason about a representational relationship 
between the imitation and the object imitated. Theōria is nonpractical. 
Theōria alone, Aristotle writes in Nicomachean Ethics 10.1177b 1-4, “is loved 
for itself. For nothing results from it except contemplating, but from practical 
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things we acquire something, to a greater or lesser degree, in addition to the 
action.” (Belfiore 1992, 67) 
Aristotle works out this relation to the experience of the contemplator in terms of his 
notion of the “cathartic” response: I will return to catharsis in the following section, 
where I consider the role of constraint. 
As we saw in the previous section, Mukařovský conceives the “aesthetic 
function” as focussed on the open-ended perception by the reader of the sign’s 
contexture.  But there is another level at which Mukařovský’s functionalism 
integrates perception and communication, which can be seen if we draw out its 
indebtedness to Karl Bühler’s instrumentalist theory of language (1990 [1934]). 
Bühler’s starting-point is the close interconnection between language and 
perception: language, according to this view, is a mediation, something through 
which things are revealed, or by means of which (as an instrument or tool) people 
are guided to look at them.9 His schema of linguistic communication presents what 
psychologists today would call the “joint-attentional situation” (Tomasello 1999; 
Eilan et al 2005):  
 
                                                     
9 Bühler points out that the etymology of common Indo-European words for “sign” (e.g. Zeichen 
(sign), σήμα (sign), δείξις (pointing), signum etc) characteristically refers to “a showing (or a 
revealing) of things to the viewer, or the other way round, leading the viewer (the viewing gaze) to the 





Figure 1 (Bühler 1990 [1934], 35) 
The sign (indicated by the circle S) encompasses three facets or “semantic functions”, 
depending on the pole of the triad to which it is oriented. Particular instances of 
language-use are “phenomena of dominance, in which one of the three fundamental 
relationships of the language sounds is in the foreground” (39). To this schema 
Mukařovský’s aesthetic function adds another phenomenological layer: the 
perception inherent in the (joint attentional) sign itself becomes an object of 
perception, since everything, under the aesthetic function, is referred back to the 
perception of the viewer or artist. In narrative, for example, the perception of the 
manifold different ways in which language can be used – its various simultaneous 
possible functions – itself becomes, by a recursive operation, the object of 
perception.  
Once again, Luhmann’s difference-theoretical account of communicative 
systems – and in particular, his concept of second-order observation – helps clarify 
the recursion at stake here. For Luhmann, as we saw in the previous section, the act 
of observing involves making a distinction of which only one side, the “marked” side, 
is visible in indicating the distinction. There remains an “unmarked space” – that is, 
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the space from which the observer makes the distinction. “At the same time,” 
Luhmann continues, “the observer – in drawing a distinction – makes himself visible 
to others. He betrays his presence – even if a further distinction is required to 
distinguish him” (Luhmann 2000, 54). In second-order observation, where one 
“observes an observer”, one “pays attention to how they observe” (Luhmann 2013, 
111) and in doing so, in distinguishing the distinction they are making, one reveals 
the unmarked space of the original distinction: “Second-order observation is 
observation of an observer with a view to that which he cannot see” (Luhmann 2013, 
112). At the same time, a second-order observation is also a first-order observation, it 
is not a free-floating, God-like omniscience: “the second-order observer remains 
anchored in the world (and accordingly observable). And he sees only what he can 
distinguish” (Luhmann 2000, 56). 
But it is a mistake, according to Luhmann, to think of observation merely in 
terms of “subjects”. From a difference-theoretical perspective, observation is an 
operation that is carried out by a communication in making a distinction: “One 
speaks about something specific and thematizes what one is speaking about. Thus, 
one uses a distinction; one speaks about this and nothing else” (Luhmann 2000, 
105). Modern societies, according to Luhmann, have developed, through their 
increasing functional differentiation and complexity, “communicative systems” that 
are based on this kind of second-order observation. The “art system” is only one 
example of such systems: other examples he cites includes the law, science, 
education and politics (Luhmann 2000, 63-5; Luhmann 2013, 115-16). To elaborate 
on just one of these examples:  scientists carry out first-order observations in their 
laboratories, but the autopoiesis of the scientific system occurs at the level of second-
order observation, when these first-order observations, mediated by publication in 
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peer-reviewed journals, are subjected to the scrutiny of other scientists, who are now 
able to observe the mode of observation of the original scientists (Luhmann 2000, 
63). 
What distinguishes the art system from these other second-order systems is 
that it produces perceptible objects or events marked by the kind of operative closure 
outlined in the previous section. The distinct boundary, the form, marked out in each 
of the recursive operations by which the artwork is constructed, presents an object 
for the joint attention of artist and perceivers: the art system in general has 
developed “the specialised function of orchestrating second-order observations” (67) 
in the form of perceptible events/objects. In narrative fiction the observation of 
observation is particularly explicit and thematised – for in this case, as I shall explore 
further in the final section, the reader is constantly invited to observe the mimetic 
representation of narrators and characters. “Narratives,” as Bruce Clarke writes, 
“beckon us to reconstruct their virtual structures as the actual traces of other 
observers, to experience those narrations as observing systems and not just as 
sequential semiotic structures” (Clarke 2014, 96). 
 
3) Coupling  
My starting-point was that Aristotle’s Poetics is about poiēsis – making. It is framed 
as a practical guide to making tragedy (and, as a subsidiary topic, epic – a second 
part of the treatise, on comedy, was lost). A large part of the book is concerned with 
practical, prescriptive advice on the construction of the tragic plot (muthos), which 
Aristotle regards as the most important aspect of making a tragedy. The definition of 
tragedy which Aristotle gives near the beginning is highly specific: 
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A tragedy [. .] is the imitation [mimēsis] of an action that is serious and also, 
as having magnitude, complete in itself; in language with pleasurable 
accessories, each kind brought in separately in the parts of the work; in a 
dramatic, not in a narrative form; with incidents arousing pity and fear, 
wherewith to accomplish its catharsis of such emotions. (Aristotle 1941, 1460 
[1449b]) 
Thus tragedy, for Aristotle, has an end or purpose that is located in the reaction of 
the audience – it is the function of tragedy to produce that particular interaction with 
the audience. And “catharsis” is not merely an emotional spasm, a response to a 
stimulus, but a process with important cognitive and ethical dimensions.10 Amélie 
Rorty identifies three sources for Aristotle’s use of the term: a medical usage, 
referring to a therapeutic cleansing or purgation; a religious usage, referring to the 
ritualized expression of dangerous emotions; and its use as “a cognitive term 
referring to an intellectual resolution or clarification that involves directing emotions 
to their appropriate intentional objects” (Rorty 1992, 14). She goes on to put forward 
a modern analogy in terms of the psychotherapeutic notion of “working through”: 
Like a therapeutic working through, catharsis occurs at the experienced sense 
of closure. In recognizing and re-cognizing the real directions of their 
attitudes, the members of an audience are able to feel them appropriately; and 
by experiencing them in their clarified and purified forms, in a ritually defined 
and bounded setting, they are able to experience, however briefly, the kind of 
psychological functioning, the balance and harmony that self-knowledge can 
bring to action. (Rorty 1992, 15) 
The role of the Aristotelian audience is thus an enactive one in which the audience 
brings to the encounter with the mimetic representation emotional responses which 
have cognitive dimensions and which are also expressions of ethical or social 
                                                     
10 “Aristotle conceives of the tragic emotions not as overwhelming waves of feeling, but as part of an 
integrated response to the structured material of poetic drama: the framework for the experience of 
these emotions is nothing other than the cognitive understanding of the mimetic representation of 
human action and character” (Halliwell 1986, 173-74). The “Poetics” should be read in the context of 




norms.11 It is the function of tragedy to fulfil the end or telos of this particular 
interaction, which lies at the juncture of, on the one hand, the tragedy’s poiēsis, its 
design and crafting, and, on the other hand, the normative emotional response of the 
audience.  
The relationship between poiēsis and catharsis is thus one of mutual 
constraint: the tragedian is constrained by the end of catharsis to adopt a particular 
approach to plot-construction, and the audience, as we have seen, is constrained by 
the poiēsis of the mimetic representation to make particular actions and events the 
object of its emotional response. Both sides of the interaction are systems. On the 
poiēsis side, running through Aristotle’s account of the construction of tragedy is an 
analogy with the way different parts and functions are co-ordinated towards a unified 
end in a living organism (Belfiore 1992, 56-7). The key term here is sustasis, 
variously translated as “structure”, “organization” or “system”.12 On the other side, 
too – the side of the audience as opposed to the mimetic representation – we find, 
rather than a unitary, elemental response, a complex interaction of cognitive, 
emotional and normative aspects. 
From the perspective of twentieth-century views on art, what is striking about 
Aristotle’s Poetics, what makes it distinctly “classical” in its outlook, is its insistence 
on a single norm guiding the work. Jan Mukařovský’s essay “The Aesthetic Norm” 
(1937) gives us, by contrast, a characteristically modern, pluralistic picture. In the art 
                                                     
11 Elizabeth Belfiore has drawn attention, in particular, to the role of the notion of philia – roughly 
“kinship”, though extending to other relationships of mutual obligation and respect (Belfiore 1992, 70-
81): “Philia is of primary importance in Aristotle’s theory of tragedy. Because the individual parts of 
the plot and the plot structure as a whole involve philia, it determines in large part the emotional 
response of the audience” (70). 
12 One of the key benefits, for Aristotle, of mimetic representations is that experience of their sustasis 
helps us better appreciate the systems and structures found in the natural world and in ourselves 
(Belfiore 1992, 68-70). As Belfiore summarises Aristotle’s perspective: “We understand systematically, 
and this know ourselves, through contemplation of the natural ‘systems’ (or ‘structures’: sustēmata, 
sustaseis) in nature that are imitated in craft products” (69-70). 
20 
 
of any period, he writes, “we can always distinguish the simultaneous activity of 
several different systems of norms” (Mukařovský 1937, 51). Furthermore, in a single 
work a “complex tangle of norms” may contend for attention, some positively 
endorsed, others making their presence felt in a “negative” way, through their 
deliberate and conspicuous violation (52) Yet this important difference – 
attributable, in Luhmann’s terms, to the autopoietic internal differentiation of the 
modern “art system” – should not blind us to the commonalities between, on the one 
hand, Mukařovský’s view of the relationship between norm, function and system, 
and, on the other hand, that of Aristotle. For Mukařovský, the significance of a norm 
is that it implements the “realization” of a function (one might say, in the terms we 
used in the previous section, that it “observes” the function). This realization of the 
function is characterized in Aristotelian, teleological terms, and also in terms of its 
operating as a constraint: 
Because such a realization [of the function] presupposes an activity tending 
towards a specific goal, we must admit that the limitation by which this 
activity is organized has in itself the character of energy as well. (Mukařovský 
1937, 49) 
A norm is a limitation, a constraint, that provides “energy” for the realization of 
functions – it is a “regulating energetic principle” (49). It is to be distinguished from 
a rule, in that it may resist codification: the limitations it imposes may not be 
expressible in words (49-50). 
 In Aristotle and Mukařovský, then, we find, in embryo, the notion of a non-
causal relationship of mutual constraint between systems. But the systems here are 
seen in terms of the traditional opposition of subject and object (the audience/reader 
on one side, the artwork (e.g. the fictional narrative) on the other), either in the form 
of Aristotelian catharsis and poiēsis, or, as we saw above, of Mukařovský’s interface, 
21 
 
set into operation by the “aesthetic function”, between the “whole” of the aesthetic 
sign and the “whole” of the subject’s existence. Luhmann goes beyond this by 
supplanting the subject/object dichotomy with the “structural coupling” of 
perception and communication.  
Luhmann adapts the notion of “structural coupling” between systems from 
Humberto Maturana (Luhmann 2013, 84-5). Coupling involves a reduction of 
complexity, since it is highly selective with regard to the environment of the system 
(85). The brain, for example, is coupled with the external environment via the 
“narrow bandwidth” of the sense organs, especially eye and ear (86). Particularly 
important and productive for human beings are the constraints generated by the 
coupling of consciousness and communication, both of which are autopoietic 
systems, but which only occur in the form of this structural coupling (86). (In this 
case, Luhmann suggests, the original coupling mechanism – the “narrow bandwidth” 
that constrains both sides – is language (87).) The artwork serves the specific 
function of systematically coupling consciousness (perception) and communication 
(“psychic and social systems”): 
Art makes perception available for communication, and it does so outside the 
standardized forms of a language (that, for its part, is perceptible). Art cannot 
overcome the separation between psychic and social systems. Both types of 
system remain operatively inaccessible to each other. And this accounts for 
the significance of art. Art integrates perception and communication without 
merging or confusing their respective operations. Integration means nothing 
more than that disparate systems operate simultaneously and constrain one 
another’s freedom. (Luhmann 2000, 48) 
Art, Luhmann writes, “makes perception available for communication”, but he could 
as well have written “makes communication available for perception”. In Section 2 I 
outlined how, for Aristotle, mimetic representation makes a communication 
(language, for example) available for perception as an observable and reproducible 
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event or object (language becomes a narration). Another way putting this is that 
among the objects we can perceive are (communicative) signs. But at the same time, 
those signs stand for objects (Marianne Moore’s “real toads in an imaginary 
garden”), so that (as we saw with Bühler’s joint attentional approach to language) 
communication and perception are tightly coupled at this level too. We have entered 
the realm of recursive second-order observation, the observation of observation, 
where the “form re-enters the form”. It is in this sense, that, as we have said, 
Luhmann, in his formulation, could have entered the cycle of perception and 
communication at any point.13 
 It is through this process of mutual constraint as between perceptual and 
communicative systems (superseding the subject/object dichotomy) that 
“communication through art tends towards system formation and eventually 
differentiates a social system of art” (Luhmann 2000, 49). Our concern here is how 
this model can be seen to manifest itself in narrative fiction. Elsewhere (Lively 2014, 
36-111) I have explored how the development of narrative fiction can be described in 
terms of the affordances it offers (especially with the transitions to written and 
printed forms) for a process of recursive embedding, whereby signs standing for joint 
attentional communication themselves become the objects of joint attention. In 
medieval tale collections (Scheherazade, Boccaccio’s Decameron, Chaucer’s 
Canterbury Tales), for example, the narrator is personified and observed (70-83). In 
Cervantes’ Don Quixote, narrators and characters become nodes in a labyrinthine 
network of recursive joint attentional perspectives (84-99). In the late nineteenth- 
and twentieth-century use of Free Indirect Discourse we find the development of an 
                                                     
13 This is not to imply that there is a stable “symmetry” to the coupling of perception and 
communication in art: indeed there may be a “runaway” gearing towards perception in the art system 
– hence modern art in which the demands of perception test the limits of communication (Umberto 
Eco’s “open work” – e.g. James Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake) (Luhmann 2000, 77).  
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oscillatory cycle of perception and communication (utterance) to evoke, at the level 
of discourse itself, the phenomenology of experience (Lively 2014, 238-53). All these 
cases can be seen as recursive, autopoietic elaborations (“ornaments”, to use a term 
of Luhmann’s (2000, 120)) of that original moment of mimetic representation when 
the actor playing Oedipus stood before his audience and spoke his line – when 
communication was perceived and perception communicated. 
Conclusion 
This paper has outlined three themes that I take to be central to any autopoietic 
approach to narrative. In Section 1 I discussed narrative as a form of communication 
that, through its own internal operations, closes itself off in order to present itself as 
an object (a mimetic representation, in Aristotle’s terms) for perception. In Section 2 
I outlined how operations that produce this closure take the form of recursive 
observations of observations (or observations of observations of observations etc) 
whereby, as Mukařovský’s concept of “contexture” clarifies, the narrative constitutes 
what one might think of as a continuously morphing but closed “state space” of 
potential and actualized functions. According to this perspective, actualization of 
functions (any particular path through the state space, if you will) will depend, in 
Luhmann’s terms, on the constraints of an observing system such as a reader. But 
this coupling itself is dependent (it is impossible to say which comes “first”) on the 
coupling whereby the narrative makes itself available simultaneously as 
communication and object of perception: it is this constraint that has been 
particularly productive in the development of narrative fiction, and that has 
determined narrative fiction’s particular fulfilment of Luhmann’s stipulation that “a 
work qualifies as art only when it employs constraints for the sake of increasing the 
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work’s freedom in disposing over further constraints” (Luhmann 2000, 35; 
emphasis in the original). 
 
Bibliography 
Aristotle, “Poetics” Translated by Ingram Bywater in The Basic Works of Aristotle 
Edited with an Introduction by Richard McKeon (Random House, New York, 
1941) 1453-87 
Mikhail Bakhtin, “Author and Hero in Aesthetic Activity” in Art and Answerability: 
Early Philosophical Essays Edited by Michael Holquist and Vadim Liapunov. 
Translated by Vadim Liapunov (University of Texas Press, Austin TX, 1990) 4-
256 
Roland Barthes, “The Reality Effect” [1968] in The Rustle of Language Translated by 
Richard Howard (University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles CA, 
1989) 141-48 
Elizabeth S. Belfiore, Tragic Pleasures: Aristotle on Plot and Emotion (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton NJ, 1992) 
Karl Bühler, Theory of Language: The Representational Function of Language 
Translated by Donald Fraser Goodwin (John Benjamins, Amsterdam, 1990 
[1934]) 
Bruce Clarke, Neocybernetics and Narrative (University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis MN, 2014) 
N. Eilan, C. Hoerl, T. McCormack & J. Roessler (eds.), Joint Attention: 
 Communication and Other Minds (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005) 
Stephen Halliwell, Aristotle’s Poetics (Duckworth, London, 1986) 
Aryeh Kosman, “Acting: Drama as the Mimēsis of Praxis” in Rorty (ed.) 51-72 
Adam Lively, “Mediation and Dynamics in the Experience of Narrative Fiction” PhD 
Thesis. Royal Holloway College, University of London, 2014. Available at 
https://mdx.academia.edu/AdamLively  
Niklas Luhmann, Art as a Social System Translated by Eva M. Knodt (Stanford 
University Press, Stanford CA, 2000) 
 Introduction to Systems Theory Edited by Dirk Baecker. Translated by Peter 
Gilgen (Polity Press, Cambridge, 2013) 
Jan Mukařovský, “The Aesthetic Norm” (1937) in Mukařovský 1977, 49-56 
25 
 
“The Place of the Aesthetic Function among Other Functions” (1942) in 
Mukařovský 1977, 31-48 
“The Concept of the Whole in the Theory of Art” (1945) in Mukařovský 1977, 
70-81  
Structure, Sign and Function: Selected Essays by Jan Mukařovský 
Translated and edited by John Burbank and Peter Steiner (Yale University 
Press, New Haven CT, 1977) 
Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative. Volume One Translated by Kathleen McLaughlin 
and David Pellauer (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1984) 
Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, (1992a) “The Psychology of Aristotelian Tragedy” in Rorty 
1992b, 1-22 
(ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Poetics (Princeton University Press, Princeton NJ, 
1992b, 
George Spencer Brown, The Laws of Form (Allen and Unwin, London, 1969) 
Peter Steiner, “Jan Mukařovský’s Structural Aesthetics” in Mukařovský 1977, ix-xxxix 
Meir Sternberg, “Telling in Time (II): Chronology, Teleology, Narrativity” Poetics  
 Today 13/3 (1992) 463-541 
Michael Tomasello, The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge MA, 1999) 
 
